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RECENT DEVELOPMENT
CIVIL PROCEDURE-THE OFFENSIVE USE OF COLLATERAL ESTOP-
PEL WHERE THE INITIAL ACTION WAS A NONJURY PROCEEDING
NOT VIOLATIVE OF THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT. Parkane Hosiery
Co. v. Shore, 99 S. Ct. 645 (1979).
I. INTRODUCTION
"Maintenance of the jury as a fact-finding body is of such impor-
tance and occupies so firm a place in our history and jurisprudence that
any seeming curtailment of the right to a jury trial should be scruti-
nized with the utmost care."'
The merits of a trial by jury have been a source of constant debate
since the Constitution was written.2 The courts have attempted to de-
fine the scope and limitations of what some now describe as a right
which is a "luxury that can no longer be afforded,"3 but as dockets have
become more crowded the debate has grown in intensity and the ex-
pansion or contraction of the right to trial by jury has continued to be a
subject for litigation.
The United States Supreme Court in its recent decision, Parklane
1. Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486 (1935).
2. The seventh amendment provides: "In suits at common law, where the value in contro-
versy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by
a jury shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the
rules of the common law." U.S. CONST. amend. VII. See generally Henderson, The Background
ofthe Seventh 4mendment, 80 HARV. L. REV. 289 (1966); Wolfram, The Constitutional History of
the Seventh 4mendment, 57 MINN. L. REV. 639 (1973). The right of trial by jury is of ancient
origin and was hailed by Blackstone as the "glory of the English law" and "the most transcendent
privilege which any subject can enjoy." 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND 379 (R. Bell ed. 1771-1772). The Supreme Court has voiced numerous eulogies to the
jury, but a debate exists over the benefits of a civil jury system balanced against the costs to the
public in terms of crowded dockets, higher damage awards, and escalating administrative costs.
C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2301 (1971).
3. C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 2, § 2301, at 10. See also De Parcq, Thoughts on the
Civil Jury, 3 TULSA L.J. 1 (1966); James, Right to a Jury Trial in Civilctions, 72 YALE L.J. 655
(1963); Kalven, The Dignity of the Civil Jury, 50 VA. L. REv. 1055 (1964); Sebille, Trial by Jury: 4n
Ineffective Survival, 10 A.B.A.J. 53 (1924); Summers, Some Merits of CivilJury Trials, 39 TUL. L.
REV. 3 (1964).
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Hosiery Co. v. Shore,4 apparently has narrowed the scope of the sev-
enth amendment right to a jury trial by affirming a court of appeals
opinion based on the doctrine of collateral estoppel.' By allowing a
plaintiff the use of this doctrine, the Court has eliminated a defendant's
right to a trial by jury on issues that could be subject to such right
except that they were decided in previous nonjury litigation.
II. THE FACTS
Parklane Hosiery Company was accused, in the original stock-
holders' class action suit, of issuing a materially false and misleading
proxy statement in connection with a merger and of being in violation
of federal securities laws and Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) regulations.6 The shareholders asked for damages, a rescission
of the merger resulting from the alleged misleading information, and
recovery of costs.7 Before this action was litigated, however, the SEC
sued the corporation for violations based on the same allegations of a
materially false and misleading proxy statement and sought injunctive
relief.' In a nonjury trial,9 a federal district court granted the SEC a
declaratory judgment which the court of appeals later affirmed.' 0
Based upon the holding in the SEC decision, the stockholders
moved for a partial summary judgment against Parklane, asserting that
the petitioners were collaterally estopped from relitigating the issues
that had been resolved against them in the earlier SEC suit. The dis-
trict court denied this motion, stating that it would deprive petitioners
of their seventh amendment right to a jury trial." The Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit reversed and held that collateral estoppel
4. 99 S. Ct. 645 (1979).
5. Shore v. Parklane Hosiery Co., 565 F.2d 815 (2d Cir. 1977).
6. According to the complaint, the proxy statement had violated §§ 10(b), 13(a), 14(a), and
20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(a), 78n(a), 78j(b), 78t(a) (1976).
565 F.2d 815 (2d Cir. 1977).
7. 565 F.2d at 817.
8. SEC v. Parklane Hosiery Co., 422 F. Supp. 477, 479 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
9. The petitioners did not have a right to a jury trial in the equitable injunctive action
brought by the SEC, as the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides for prompt enforcement
actions by the SEC unhindered by private parallel actions. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(g) (1976). Further-
more, in SEC v. Everest Management Corp., 475 F.2d 1236 (2d Cir. 1972), the court stated that
"the complicating effect of the additional issues and the additional parties outweighs any advan-
tage of a single disposition of the common issues." Id. at 1240.
10. SEC v. Parklane Hosiery Co., 558 F.2d 1083 (2d Cir. 1977).
11. The court based its denial of the motion on Rachal v. Hill, 435 F.2d 59 (5th Cir. 1970).
565 F.2d at 818.
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could be applied "offensively"' 2 by a plaintiff in a subsequent suit and
that this use of the doctrine would not violate the other party's right to
a jury trial on the issues in question. 3 This court stated, "the Seventh
Amendment preserves the right to a jury trial only with respect to is-
sues of fact, once those issues have been fully and fairly adjudicated in
a prior proceeding, nothing remains for trial, either with or without a
jury."'14 Because the holding was in conflict with a position taken by
the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Rachal v. Hill,15 the
Supreme Court granted certiorari.' 6 The Court in the present case ex-
amined and affirmed the Second Circuit's holding, resulting in a nar-
rowing of the scope of the seventh amendment right to a trial by jury.17
III. DisCUSSION
The Supreme Court addressed two major issues posed by the
lower court's decision:
(1) Whether a litigant who was not a party to a prior judg-
ment may nevertheless use that judgment "offensively"
under the general law of collateral estoppel to prevent a
defendant from relitigating issues resolved in the earlier
proceeding;' S
(2) Whether the use of offensive collateral estoppel in this
case would violate the petitioner's seventh amendment
right to a trial by jury. 19
In an 8-1 decision, the Court in Parklane agreed with the Second Cir-
12. Offensive use of collateral estoppel occurs when the plaintiff seeks to foreclose the de-
fendant from litigating an issue which the defendant had previously litigated unsuccessfully in an
action with another party. A similar type of collateral estoppel is called "defensive" use and
occurs when a defendant seeks to prevent a plaintiff from asserting a claim that the plaintiff had
previously litigated and lost against another defendant. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 99 S. Ct.
at 649 n.4. Notice that in both the offensive and defensive use situations, the party against whom
the estoppel is asserted had litigated and lost in an earlier action. For a more extensive overview
of the effects of these doctrines, see Currie, Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel- Limits of the
Bernhard Doctrine, 9 STAN. L. REv. 281 (1957); Semmel, Collateral Estoppel, Mutuality and Join-
der of Parties, 68 COLUM. L. REv. 1457 (1968); Note, The Impacts of Defensive and Offensive
Assertion of Collateral Estoppel by a Nonparty, 35 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 1010 (1967).
13. 565 F.2d at 824.
14. Id. at 819.
15. 435 F.2d 59 (5th Cir. 1970).
16. The Rachal court held that use of the doctrine of collateral estoppel in a very similar
factual situation violated the defendant's seventh amendment rights. See Shapiro & Coquillette,
The Fetish of Jury Trial in Civil Cases: .4 Comment on Rachal v. Hill, 85 HARV. L. REV. 442
(1971); 40 U. CINN. L. REV. 373 (1971).
17. 99 S. Ct. at 645.
18. Id. at 649.
19. Id. at 652.
19791
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cuit and held that the respondents could offensively apply the doctrine
of collateral estoppel without violating the petitioner's right to a jury
trial."z A discretionary test was established for courts to use in future
suits involving offensive collateral estoppel z.2  The overall eroding ef-
fect of Parklane on the right to a jury trial cannot accurately be deter-
mined until this test is applied in several cases. Following is an
analysis of both the majority opinion and Justice Rehnquist's dissent in
this case.
In determining that a plaintiffs offensive use of collateral estoppel
could be applied in preventing a defendant from relitigating issues pre-
viously litigated and lost against another plaintiff, the Court looked at
the general purposes and effects of collateral estoppel. 2 The signifi-
cance of the law of collateral estoppel is that it precludes the repeated
controversy of matters that already have been judicially determined.23
One court said it is a "reasonable measure calculated to save individu-
als and courts from the waste and burden of relitigating old issues."24
It, however, does not act as a complete bar to subsequent action, and
certain elements must be met before its application will be allowed. 25
The most fundamental requirement is that the question of fact or law
must have been actually litigated previously. Furthermore, the losing
party must have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate and the in-
centive to do so before he will be estopped from relitigating the issue. 6
Historically, the use of collateral estoppel was limited by another
element requiring both parties to have been bound by the prior judg-
ment before either party could estop the other from relitigating an is-
sue. 7 The modem trend has been to discard this mutuality
20. Id. at 654-55.
21. See note 36 infra and accompanying text.
22. "Collateral estoppel, like the related doctrine of res judicata, has the dual purpose of
protecting litigants from the burden of relitigating an identical issue with the same party or his
privy and of promoting judicial economy by preventing needless litigation." 99 S. Ct. at 649
(footnote omitted) (citing Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Foundation, 402 U.S.
313, 328-29 (1971)).
23. J. MooRE & J. WICKER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.441, at 3779 (2d ed. 1974).
24. Tillman v. Nat'l City Bank, 118 F.2d 631, 634 (9th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 650
(1941).
25. See Comment, Subsequent Use of Ciil Adjudications of Obscenity, 13 TULSA L.J. 146,
164-65 (1977).
26. Id. at 166-67.
27. 40 U. CINN. L. REv. 373, 376 (1971). In a frequently cited article commenting on the
doctrine of mutuality, Professor Currie stated:
There is no virtue in the mutuality requirement as such. . . .In general, one who
was not a party to the prior action should be allowed to plead the former judgment
against one who was a party, or in privity with a party, to the prior action, and this is true
[ ol. 14:813
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requirement and to preclude a party from relitigating any issue decided
against him in a prior action, even if the party asserting the estoppel
was a stranger to the prior action.2 8 Justice Traynor criticized the mu-
tuality doctrine in Bernhard v. Bank of America National Trust & Sav-
ings Association,29 the landmark case wherein the California Supreme
Court discarded the rule. In a decision frequently quoted in subse-
quent federal cases abandoning the doctrine, Justice Traynor observed:
"No satisfactory rationalization has been advanced for the requirement
of mutuality. Just why a party who was not bound by a previous action
should be precluded from asserting it as res judicata against a party
who was bound by it is difficult to comprehend. 3 °
By abandoning the mutuality requirement in the use of collateral
estoppel, the courts have opened the door for expanding encroachment
on the seventh amendment right to a jury trial. For example, in
Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation,3'
the Supreme Court held that the mutuality requirement was unneces-
sary in a case involving the defensive use of collateral estoppel. The
plaintiff was estopped from reasserting a claim that his patent was valid
when he previously had lost this validity argument in a federal court
trial with another defendant.32 The mutuality requirement was aban-
doned on the basis that the only safeguard needed for protecting the
litigants from an unfair application of estoppel was a test to determine
"whether or not the party against whom an estoppel is asserted had a
full and fair opportunity to litigate."' 33 This "full and fair opportunity"
rule has become the contemporary law of collateral estoppel and was
the ultimate basis for the discretionary rule devised by the Court in
Parklane for determining the applicability of offensive collateral estop-
pel.34
Before extending the Blonder-Tongue rule to the present case in-
volving an offensive use of collateral estoppel, the Supreme Court
irrespective of whether the plea is asserted as the basis for a claim or as a defense. This
principle furthers the policy against repeated litigation of the same issue by the same
party.
Currie, Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel- Limits of the Bernhard Doctrine, 9 STAN. L. REv. 281,
308 (1957). See also Semmel, Collateral Estoppel, Mutuality and Joinder ofParties, 68 COLUM. L.
REv. 1457 (1968); Annot., 31 A.L.R.3d 1044 (1970).
28. 40 U. Cinn. L. Rev. 373, 377 (1971).
29. Bernhard v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Sav. Assoc., 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942).
30. Id. at 812, 122 P.2d at 895.
31. 402 U.S. 313 (1971).
32. Id.
33. Id. at 329.
34. See note 36 infra and accompanying text.
1979]
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looked closely at the differences between the offensive and defensive
use situations. They found that refusal to allow the use of offensive
collateral estoppel could be justified on the basis of two factors: (1)
offensive use of collateral estoppel does not promote judicial economy
in the same manner as defensive use does because potential plaintiffs
may adopt a "wait and see" attitude and increase, rather than decrease,
the total amount of litigation,35 and (2) offensive use may be unfair to
the defendant because he may have had little incentive in the first suit
to defend vigorously, especially if the suit was for small or nominal
damages, or if future suits were not foreseeable.36 The Court estab-
lished a discretionary approach for federal courts to deal with these
factors by not expressly precluding the use of offensive collateral estop-
pel and by allowing the trial courts broad discretion in determining
when it should be applied. The Court stated that the general rule
should be
that in cases where a plaintiff could easily have joined in the
earlier action or where, either for the reasons discussed above
or for other reasons, the application of offensive estoppel
would be unfair to a defendant, a trial judge should not allow
the use of offensive collateral estoppel.37
In Parkiane, however, the Court concluded that none of the justifying
factors existed for refusing to allow the doctrine to be applied. First,
there was no private plaintiff who might have been waiting on the side-
lines to gain the advantages of the first litigation without joining in that
action. The respondent in this case could not have joined in the SEC
action even had he so desired. 38 Second, the seriousness of the allega-
tions in both suits, plus the fact that respondent's suit was actually filed
before the SEC action, prevented the unfairness argument from being
35. 99 S. Ct. at 651. Defensive use of collateral estoppel precludes a plaintiff from reliti-
gating identical issues by merely "switching adversaries." Thus defensive collateral es-
toppel gives a plaintiff a strong incentive to join all potential defendants in the first
action if possible. Offensive use of collateral estoppel, on the other hand, creates pre-
cisely the opposite incentive.
Id. (citations omitted) (footnote omitted). In using offensive collateral estoppel a plaintiff can sit
back and rely on a previous judgment against a defendant, but will not be bound if the defendant
wins. Id.
36. Id. Unfairness may result if. (I) the first action involves small or nominal damages, but
the subsequent action involves much more, (2) the judgment relied upon as a basis for estoppel is
inconsistent with one or more previous judgments in favor of the defendant, or (3) the second
action provides the defendant procedural opportunities unavailable in the first action that could
readily cause a different result. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 652. See also note 13 supra and accompanying text.
[Vol. 14:813
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applicable.3 9 In conclusion, the Court held "[s]ince the petitioners re-
ceived a 'full and fair' opportunity to litigate their claims in the SEC
action, the contemporary law of collateral estoppel leads inescapably to
the conclusion that the petitioners are collaterally estopped from reliti-
gating the question of whether the proxy statements were materially
false and misleading."4
The second issue addressed by the Court in Parklane was whether
the use of offensive collateral estoppel in this case would violate the
petitioners' seventh amendment right to a trial by jury.41 In determin-
ing that this right was not violated, the Court relied extensively on his-
tory and on recent cases on the subject of jury trials in civil actions to
interpret the meaning of the seventh amendment.
Recent decisional law provided a basis for the proposition that an
equitable determination can have a collateral estoppel effect on a sub-
sequent legal action. In Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover,42 the
Supreme Court said that the right to a jury trial on a legal claim is not
defeated because the claim is initially asserted in an equitable proceed-
ing.43 It also indicated that a right to jury trial may be foreclosed by
the doctrines of res judicata or collateral estoppel if issues common to
both the legal and equitable claims were determined by a judge before
the jury trial was demanded.' In Katchen v. Landy,4 5 the Court also
recognized that an equitable determination by a bankruptcy court
could have collateral estoppel effect in a subsequent legal action with-
out violating the seventh amendment.46
The petitioners in Parklane insisted that an application of the doc-
trine in the case at bar would violate their right to a jury trial because
of historical considerations.47 Since the scope of the seventh amend-
39. "[I]n light of the serious allegations made in the SEC's complaint against petitioners as
well as the foreseeability of subsequent private suits that typically follow a successful government
judgment, the petitioners had every incentive to litigate the SEC lawsuit fully and vigorously." 99
S. Ct. at 652.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 664.
42. 359 U.S. 500 (1959). For a discussion of the implications of this case, see Kane, CivilJury
Trial.- The Casefor Reasoned Iconoclasm, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 1 (1976); McCoid, Procedural Reform
and the Right to Jury Trial- .4 Study ofBeacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 1
(1967); Redish, Seventh Amendment Right to Jury Trial- 4 Study in the Irrationality of Rational
Decision Making, 70 Nw. L. REv. 487 (1975).
43. 359 U.S. at 505.
44. Id.
45. 382 U.S. 323 (1966).
46. Id. at 334.
47. 99 S. Ct. at 653.
1979]
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ment must be determined by reference to the common law as it existed
in 1791,48 petitioners claimed that the doctrine of mutuality was a re-
quirement in 1791 for an application of collateral estoppel, and that the
common law right as preserved must preclude the use of estoppel in
their case as there was no mutuality of parties.49 The Court dismissed
this argument by categorizing collateral estoppel as a procedural doc-
trine not bound by the 1791 common law. 0 Using the rationale and
words of its holding in Galloway v. United States," where the procedu-
ral theory of directed verdicts was questioned as unconstitutional, the
Court restated its views of the seventh amendment:
The Amendment did not bind the federal courts to the exact
procedural incidents or details of jury trial according to the
common law in 1791, any more than it tied them to the com-
mon-law system of pleading or the specific rules of evidence
then prevailing. Nor were the rules of the common law then
prevalent, including those relating to the procedure by which
the judge regulated the jury's role on questions of fact, crys-
talized [sic] in a fixed and immutable system ....
The more logical conclusion, we think, and the one
which both history and the previous decision here support, is
that the Amendment was designed to preserve the basic insti-
tution of jury trial in only its most fundamental elements, not
the great mass of procedural forms and details varying even
then so widely among common-law jurisdictions.5 2
The Parkiane Court then held that, "if. . . the law of collateral estop-
pel forecloses the petitioners from relitigating the factual issues deter-
mined against them in the SEC action, nothing in the Seventh
Amendment dictates a different result, even though because of lack of
mutuality there would have been no collateral estoppel in 179 1."' The
judgment of the Court of Appeals of the Second Circuit was affirmed,5 4
48. Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474 (1935). "In order to ascertain the scope and meaning of
the Seventh Amendment, resort must be had to the appropriate rules of the common law estab-
lished at the time of the adoption of that constitutional provision in 179!." Id. at 476, See a/so
Wolfram, The ConsiftutionalHistory of the Seventh.4mendmenl, 57 MINN. L. REv. 639, 642 (1973).
49. 99 S. Ct. at 654. The Court responded, "[tihe petitioners have advanced no persuasive
reason, however, why the meaning of the Seventh Amendment should depend on whether or not
mutuality of parties is present." Id.
50. Id. "[M]any procedural devices developed since 1791 that have diminished the civil
jury's historic domain have been found not to be inconsistent with the Seventh Amendment." Id.
51. 319 U.S. 372 (1943).
52. 99 S. Ct. at 654 (quoting Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, at 390-92 (1943)).
53. 99 S. Ct. at 654-55.
54. Id. at 655.
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and the intercircuit conflict was resolved against the Fifth Circuit's
opinion in Rachal v. Hill.
Justice Rehnquist, in his dissenting opinion, viewed an offensive
application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel as unfair if the party to
be estopped had not had an opportunity to have the facts of his case
determined by a jury.- Since in this case petitioners were not entitled
to a jury trial in the SEC suit,56 they should not be estopped from reliti-
gating the issues before a jury in the private action. He claimed to have
based his reasoning on several factors, but simply reiterated arguments
expounding the virtues of jury trials.
First, the dissent stated that even if there is no seventh amendment
violation, the use of collateral estoppel in this case "runs counter to the
strong federal policy favoring jury trials."57 Citing Beacon Theatres,
Inc. v. Westover,58 Jacob v. New York,59 Simler v. Conner,6" and Byrd v.
Blue Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc.61 as representative Supreme
Court cases expressing a strong federal policy in favor of juries, Justice
Rehnquist disclosed his fears that the Parklane decision would be a
"wholesale abrogation of jury trials' 62 and would deprive a large
number of defendants in private actions of their rights to trials by
jury.63
Second, Rehnquist believed that the estoppel was unfair because
"the opportunity for a jury trial in the second action could easily lead
to a different result from that obtained in the first action before the
court."64 Rehnquist again directed his argument toward the virtues of
a jury trial and found the majority's characterization of the jury as a
"neutral" procedural factor to be contrary to his personal beliefs. 65 He
55. Id. at 652.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 662.
58. 359 U.S. 500 (1959). "Only under the most imperative circumstances. . . can the right to
a jury trial of legal issues be lost through prior determination of equitable claims." ld. at 510-11,
quoted in 99 S. Ct. at 662 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
59. 315 U.S. 752, 752-53 (1942). "The right ofjury trial in civil cases at common law is...
[a] right so fundamental and sacred to the citizen . . . [it] should be jealously guarded by the
courts." 99 S. Ct. at 662.
60. 372 U.S. 221 (1963).
61. 356 U.S. 525, 537-39 (1958) (cited to show that strong federal policy in favor of juries
requires jury trials in diversity cases, regardless of state practice).
62. 99 S. Ct. at 662.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 663.
65. "As is evident from the prior brief discussion of the development of the civil jury trial
guarantee in this country, those who drafted the Declaration of Independence and debated so
passionately... would indeed be astounded to learn that the presence or absence of a jury is
1979]
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argued,
I suspect that anyone who litigates cases before juries in the
1970's would be equally amazed to hear of the supposed lack
of distinction between trial by court and trial by jury. The
Court can cite no authority in support of this curious proposi-
tion. The merits of civil juries have been long debated, but I
suspect that juries have never been accused of being merely
"neutral" factors.
Contrary to the majority's supposition, juries can make a
difference . . 66
Rehnquist was disturbed by a "nagging sense of unfairness" '67
about the Parkiane holding which he believed was a continuation of
the process of judicial erosion of the essential guarantee of a right to
jury trial in civil cases provided by the seventh amendment. In a his-
torical review of the background of the inclusion of the jury trial right
in the Bill of Rights, Rehnquist stated, "[tlhe founders of our Nation
considered the right of trial by jury in civil cases an important bulwark
against tyranny and corruption, a safeguard too precious to be left to
the whim of the sovereign, or, it might be added, to that of the judici-
ary."68 He felt that the Court had expanded the existing rationale be-
yond its reasonable limit and infringed upon the defendant's rights in a
manner far greater than it had sanctioned ever before.6 9 He argued
that application of the principles expounded in Galloway only weak-
ened and subverted a fundamental right.7 0 He was unwilling to accept
the Court's presumption that the complete extinguishment of the peti-
tioner's right to trial by jury could be justified as a mere procedural
incident or detail. He viewed the development of nonmutual estoppel
as a "substantial departure from the common law and its use in this
case completely deprives petitioners of their right to have a jury deter-
mine contested issues of fact."'7'
He concluded by claiming that the ultimate irony of the decision
merely 'neutral' .... " Id. Rehnquist was referring to the majority's statement that "the pres-
ence or absence of a jury as a factfinder is basically neutral. . . ." Id. at 652 n.19.
66. Id. at 663. Rehnquist attempted to use an emotional argument to overcome what he
termed the majority's "antiseptic analysis of the issues in this case." Id. at 655.
67. He admitted difficulty at feeling outraged with respect to a corporate defendant in a se-
curities fraud action, but still did not feel the petitioners were treated fairly. Id. at 655.
68. Id. at 657.
69. Id. at 660.
70. "In the instant case, resort to the doctrine of collateral estoppel does more than merely
contract the right to a jury trial It eliminates the right entirely and therefore contravenes the
Seventh Amendment." Id. at 660.
71. Id. at 661.
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was that it would not even serve the supposed purpose of the doctrine
of collateral estoppel, which is to promote judicial economy.72 In Park-
lane the petitioners were still entitled to a jury determination of
whether the respondents had been damaged by the alleged misrepre-
sentation, and if so, the amount of damages. Therefore, a jury would
be empaneled anyway, and the time saved by not retrying the issue of
whether the proxy was materially false and misleading before the jury
was likely to be negligible.
7 3
The decision in Parklane was both necessary and just. It certainly
can be stated that the holding represents an encroachment on a previ-
ously allowed right to trial by jury.74 It also can be said that the right
should never have been allowed and that the limitation is appropriate
in a time of growing concern over crowded dockets, the size of judg-
ments, and the costs of litigation.75 The Court reasoned through a seri-
ous analysis of history, precedent, and policy before concluding that
the petitioners in Parklane could not reasonably demand a jury trial on
issues that previously had been fully litigated.76 Why should the time
of the court and a jury be taken up with relitigation of an issue already
fully tried in a proceeding in a coordinate court whose procedures were
comparable in every respect except the availability of a jury. 7 7 The
benefits of allowing a jury trial in this situation were outweighed by the
costs to the public, and perhaps the trend of resolving every close ques-
tion of this type in favor of the jury trial right has finally been cur-
tailed.78
The traditional method of determining whether a litigant has the
right to a jury trial in a federal court is often termed the "historical
approach." Under this approach it must be decided whether the partic-
ular case or issue in question would have been tried at law or equity in
1791, the year in which the seventh amendment was ratified.79 This
72. Id. at 664. See generally Semmel, Collateral Estoppel, Mutuality and Joinder of Parties,
68 COLUM. L. REV. 1457 (1968); Note, The Impacts of Defensive and Offensive Assertion of Collat-
eral Estoppel by a Nonarty, 35 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 1010 (1967).
73. 99 S. Ct. at 664.
74. See, e.g., Rachal v. Hill, 435 F.2d 59 (5th Cir. 1970).
75. See generally, Shapiro & Coquillette, The Fetish of Jury Trial in Civil Cases: A Comment
on Rachal v. Hill, 85 HARV. L. REv. 442 (1971).
76. 99 S. Ct. at 645.
77. For a negative answer, see Shapiro & Coquillette, The Fetish of Jury Trial in Civil Cases:
A Comment on Rachal v. Hill, 85 HARV. L. REV. 442, 457 (1971).
78. Cf. Id. at 442. See also Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the Seventh Amendment,
57 MINN. L. REv. 639, 642 (1973).
79. See note 48 supra and accompanying text.
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historical test influenced the Supreme Court's decision in Park/ane and
is important to an analysis of this case.
The Court recognized that the "thrust of the Seventh Amendment
was to preserve the right to jury trial as it existed in 1791," but pro-
ceeded to categorize the collateral estoppel issue as a procedural device
that was not preserved under the seventh amendment right.80 Justice
Rehnquist, dissenting, found this portion of the majority opinion to be
particularly distasteful in view of its consequences:
To say that the Seventh Amendment does not tie federal
courts to the exact procedure of the common law in 1791 does
not imply, however, that any nominally "procedural" change
can be implemented, regardless of its impact on the functions
of the jury. For to sanction creation of procedural devices
which limit the province of the jury to a greater degree than
permitted at common law in 1791 is in direct contravention of
the Seventh Amendment ....
The guarantees of the Seventh Amendment will prove
burdensome in some instances . . . . But, . . . the onerous
nature of the protection is no license for contracting the rights
secured by the Amendment."'
The fault in this reasoning lies in the assumption that collateral estop-
pel would not have been allowed at common law, and that the peti-
tioner would definitely have had a right to litigate his issues had he
been in court in 1791. The language of the amendment has consistently
been construed to mean its single purpose was to preserve the essentials
of the jury trial in actions at law,8 2 but, where the action may have been
resolved in a court of equity (Court of Chancery in 1791),"3 then the
jury trial right does not have to be preserved. The specific issue of
collateral estoppel must be viewed in light of equity and law court deci-
sions to determine whether it can be used to prevent a jury trial today.
In classifying collateral estoppel as a procedural device which has
developed since 1791,84 the Court in Parkiane relied on its earlier deci-
sion in Galloway v. United States"5 in which it stated that the amend-
ment was designed to preserve only the most fundamental elements of
80. 99 S. Ct. at 652 (citing Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 193 (1974)).
81. 99 S. Ct. at 659.
82. See Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 490 (1935) (Stone, J., dissenting).
83. See Shapiro & Coquillette, The Fetish fJury Trialin Civil Cases.- A Comment on Rachal
v. Hill, 85 HARv. L. REv. 442, 451 (1971).
84. 99 S. Ct. at 654.
85. 319 U.S. 372 (1943).
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the basic institution of jury trials, and was not designed to protect pro-
cedural details.16 The Court also correctly referred to Beacon Thea-
tres87 and Katchen v. Land 88 as precedent for the proposition that an
equitable determination could have collateral estoppel effect in a subse-
quent legal action without violating seventh amendment rights.89 A
combination of ideas from Galloway and Katchen provided the Court
with an adequate logical basis for its extension of the application of
collateral estoppel to Parklane. The Restatement of Judgments also il-
lustrates this general rule of collateral estoppel: "Where in a proceed-
ing in equity a question of fact is actually litigated and determined by a
valid and final decree, the determination is conclusive between the par-
ties in a subsequent proceeding at law or equity on a different cause of
action."9 It was the Court's responsibility to scrutinize this "seeming
curtailment of the right to a jury trial ' 91 with utmost care. Even Justice
Rehnquist's emotional plea for jury trial rights92 does not provide evi-
dence that the majority neglected its scrutinizing duty before encroach-
ing upon these rights. Among legal scholars and commentators alike,
there is no concensus on the desirability of jury trials in civil actions
generally, 93 so this decision, no matter how well reasoned, will offend
some staunch advocates of a broad reading of the seventh amendment.
The policy rationale underlying this decision provides a strong ba-
sis for recognizing its potential as an important case in the line of sev-
enth amendment litigation. By allowing trial courts discretion to
determine the applicability of offensive collateral estoppel,94 the Court
has provided alternatives based on fairness to the parties involved in
each individual suit.95 The Court expressly stated that each party must
have been given a full and fair opportunity to litigate his claims before
86. Id. at 392.
87. 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
88. 382 U.S. 323 (1966).
89. See notes 42-45 supra and accompanying text.
90. RESTATEMENT OF JUDGEMENTS § 68, Comment j (1942). Note that this statement of the
general principle is limited by a mutuality of parties requirement.
91. Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 485 (1934).
92. 99 S. Ct. at 655-88.
93. See J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH & REALITY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE (1950). For
criticisms ofjury trial, see, e.g., Peck, Do Juries Delay Justice?, 18 F.R.D. 455 (1956); Sebille, Trial
by Jury: An Ineffective Survival, 10 A.B.A.J. 53 (1924). The system is defended in De Parcq,
Thoughts on the Civil Jury, 3 TULSA L.J. 1 (1966); Kalven, The Dignity ofthe Civil Jury, 50 VA. L.
REV. 1055 (1964); Summers, Some Merits of Civil Jury Trials, 39 TUL. L. REV. 3 (1964).
94. 99 S. Ct. at 651.
95. Id. at 652.
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collateral estoppel could be applied.96 This reliance on individual facts
and a fairness doctrine provides judges in future suits discretion to for-
bid wasting the court's time and the public's and parties' money. No
rights are lost by a party who has actually litigated an issue before. In
the Parklane case, the issues in question were fully litigated in a previ-
ous governmental action where the defendant not only had a full and
fair opportunity to litigate, but had a strong incentive to defend vigor-
ously his actions.97 A jury trial of these same issues is not necessary
when they already have been aired in a previous adversary proceeding.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court in Parkiane wisely has established a discre-
tionary rule for federal trial courts to use in determining the applicabil-
ity of offensive collateral estoppel. Situations where this question may
arise are rare, but the decision seems to reverse a trend of court deci-
sions favoring jury trials. The seventh amendment never was intended
to provide a jury trial right for every matter that comes before a court,
although courts in the past often have been reluctant to deny a jury
trial when the question arose. Park/ane is based on reason, common
sense, and fairness; so, although the result is a "seeming curtailment of




97. Id. at 65 1.
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